Abstract: This paper deals with the influence of different types of government expenditure on growth. It widens that proposed by the literature which follows the lines set by Barro (1990) because it adds the changes working through the demand side, generated by the variations in the distribution of the net income of the economy, to those working through the supply side, generated by the variations in factor productivity. The analysis considers a government sector with a balanced budget and an autonomous and nonlinear investment function, interpreted along a Kaleckian and a Classical-Harrodian line. It shows under which conditions different types of government expenditure are beneficial or detrimental for economic growth, comparing some results with those reached by Barro (1990) and points out the emergence of phenomena like multiple equilibria, hysteresis and low growth traps.
Introduction
This paper deals with the role of different types of government expenditure in post-Keynesian analysis. This subject has been largely overlooked by this tradition of thought, in spite of the attention paid to it by its founders. As Pressman (1994) notices, Keynes underlined that there are economic and political reasons for preferring certain kinds of expenditures to others. Kaldor (1958, pp. 136-137; 1966; 1967; and 1971) pointed out that the composition of government expenditure has important effects on long-run growth. For him, a large government consumption can transform the economy into one with low investment, with some undesirable consequences on its international competitiveness and long-run growth due to the fact that the capital goods sector tends to enjoy higher rates of variation in productivity than the consumption goods sector.
The views of Keynes and Kaldor, which provide interesting insights into the complexity of the growth processes, were presented in a descriptive way, nor have they been subsequently formalised by other authors. A formal treatment of the role of the government sector in the post-Keynesian theory of growth refers to one kind of expenditure without analysing the effects on the coefficients of production (see You and Dutt, 1996; Lavoie, 2000; Commendatore, Panico and Pinto, 2005) .
A more detailed account of the influence of government expenditure on growth can be found in the literature that follows the lines set by Barro (1990) . This author assumes that government expenditure enters the production function and is complementary with private inputs. It has two opposite effects on the rate of growth, one positive, working through the increase in the productivity of private capital, and one negative, working through the reduction of saving due to the variation in tax revenues. The economic mechanisms captured by this analysis only refer to the effects on the rate of growth emerging in the production or supply side of the economy. Those produced by the variations in income distribution and effective demand are absent.
In what follows an attempt is made to develop an analysis that also takes into account the influence on the rate of growth of the variations in income distribution and effective demand generated by changes in government expenditure. Like in Barro (1990) , here too government expenditure enters the production function, even though not directly as an input, but indirectly by affecting the coefficients of production. Moreover, the increase in productivity does not necessarily lead to an increase in the rate of growth of the economy. In our analysis, however, this result is due to the assumption that government expenditure affects factor productivity and to other effects, generated of the economy.
The analysis presented below develops a model that introduces a government sector, which works with a balanced budget, and an autonomous investment function, which is nonlinear. This second assumption allows the model to reproduce a variety of complex phenomena. Some of them, related to the analysis of what characterizes the equilibrium solutions, are examined in this paper. They clarify different aspects of how government intervention affects the rate of growth of the economy, underlining the possible occurrence of multiple equilibrium solutions, low growth traps and hysteresis. Some others, related to the analysis of the dynamic processes, are examined in a different essay (Commendatore, Panico and Pinto, 2009) . They clarify the different ways in which government intervention can affect the stability of the economy, underlining the possible occurrence of regular and irregular growth cycles.
The model can be interpreted along Kaleckian and Classical-Harrodian lines. The first interpretation considers the state of long-term expectations of investors as exogenously given, driven for instance by entrepreneurs' animal spirits. The second considers that investors' expectations are related to the "warranted rate of growth", in the sense that the expected level of demand and output of the economy is the one corresponding to that rate.
1 Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996, pp. 316-317) points out that in some path-breaking empirical works of the 1980s and the early 1990s the distinction between "productive" and "unproductive" government expenditure was related to that between "capital" and "current" government expenditure. In the subsequent years the difference between productive and unproductive changed and became related to the ability of each type of expenditure to influence positively the rate of growth of the economy. Within this approach every kind of expenditure could be productive or unproductive depending on its share in total expenditure. In what follows we take a different line and define "productive" and "unproductive" expenditures according to their ability to affect productivity.
Both interpretations underline, in opposition to the literature following the lines set by Barro (1990) , the role played by income distribution and the fact that the rate of growth crucially depends on the influence of government expenditure on after-tax profits. In the Kaleckian interpretation the rate of growth moves in the contrary direction to after-tax profits. In the Classical-Harrodian interpretation the opposite tendency occurs. The different result depends on the investment function.
In the Kaleckian interpretation proposed below the degree of capital utilization is what matters, so that, on account of the low propensity to consume of the profit-earners, effective demand rises when after-tax profits decrease, leading entrepreneurs to invest more. This expansionary influence on effective demand is able to produce structural breaks, movements away from " low growth traps" and hysteresis effects.
In the Classical-Harrodian interpretation a prominent role is played by the "warranted rate of growth", which is linked to saving in such a way as to establish a direct relationship between the rate of growth and after-tax profits. In this interpretation there are no structural breaks and hysteresis effects, but it is possible to identify a size of the government sector that maximizes the rate of growth. There is here some similarity with the results reached by Barro (1990) , in the sense that the relationship between the rate of growth and the size of the government sector has the shape of a bell. In the Classical-Harrodian analysis however the shape of this relationship depends on the variations in the distribution of income within the economy, rather than on the assumption that the marginal productivity is decreasing.
Finally, both the Kaleckian and the Classical-Harrodian analyses make it possible to extend to an economy with the government sector some growth regimes identified by the post-Keynesian literature.
The paper is so organised. Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 deals with its Kaleckian interpretation showing how "productive" and "unproductive" government expenditures can affect the rate of growth within this framework. Section 4 deals with the Classical-Harrodian interpretation of the model and its results. Section 5 presents some conclusions.
The model
We consider a single-good closed economy with two inputs of production: labour (L) with a perfectly elastic supply and fixed capital (K) that does not depreciate. Technical progress is excluded and the production function is of a Leontief type. 1/a and 1/b represent the capital and labour coefficients, respectively. Moreover in each period the capital stock is not fully utilised and 
where λ is the wage-productivity elasticity and measures the ability of the unions to capture labour productivity improvements. When 1 λ < workers only capture a portion of the increase in productivity; when instead 1 λ ≥ the increase in the wage rate is equal or higher than the rate of variation of productivity.
The model assumes that workers do not save and the investment function is not linear:
where s is the ratio between saving and capital, s π is the propensity to save out of profits, τ is the tax rate and g is the rate of variation of capital, which depends on an autonomous term ( ) and on a nonlinear component ( ( ) u φ ) which enjoys the following properties:
where 0 1 < ≤ u is the "normal" degree of capacity utilization, interpreted as the optimal degree of capacity utilization given the existing technology.
Equation (3) assumes that investment is an "S-shaped" function of the degree of capacity utilisation (see Figures 1 and 4 below): when capacity utilisation is low the propensity to invest is weak, it improves when capacity utilisation rises, and slows down again when capital utilisation is high.
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The autonomous component of the investment function can be interpreted along two different lines.
Following a Kaleckian interpretation, = α α reflects entrepreneurs' animal spirits and is taken as given like the state of long-term expectations in Keynesian models (see Rowthorn, 1981; Dutt, 1984; Amadeo, 1986; and Lavoie 1992) . Along a Classical-Harrodian interpretation, g α = , where
− is the warranted rate of growth and ≡ r au π is the rate of profit corresponding to normal capacity utilisation (for a similar interpretation, see Commendatore, D'Acunto, Panico and Pinto, 2003; and Shaikh, 2007) .
The model further assumes that the government sector operates with a balanced budget:
where taxation and government expenditure γ are measured in terms of net income.
Like Barro (1990, p . S107), we assume that the government enhances input productivity by purchasing goods and services that are freely provided to the private sector. 5 Unlike Barro, however, in our analysis the influence of government expenditure is described as a positive externality that changes the input coefficients. Moreover, we only focus on the case in which it influences b, the labour productivity:
When government expenditure affects labour productivity, the wage share may vary too, depending on the bargaining power of the unions, i.e. on the value of λ. This assumption makes it possible, using equations (1), (4) and (5), to describe pre-tax profits as a function of government expenditure:
If the wage rate increases less than labour productivity, pre-tax profits increase. The opposite occurs when the wage rate increases more than labour productivity.
The influence of government expenditure on after-tax profits,
π π γ = − , can be described as follows:
(1 )
The sign of this derivative depends on b′ , the effect of government expenditure on labour productivity, and on λ, the elasticity of wages to changes in productivity. We identify three cases in which, for all values of γ , the sign is negative:
1. Government expenditure does not affect labour productivity, i.e. 0 b′ = , from which it follows 0 π ′ = ; 5 Taking into account the existence of capital owned by the government sector would increase the complexity of the analysis. We leave this study to further research. 6 The analysis of the influence of government expenditure on the productivity of capital is not qualitatively different from that developed here. 8 2. Government expenditure affects labour productivity, 0 b′ > , and wages rise at least at the same rate as productivity, 1 λ ≥ , which implies 0 π ′ ≤ , i.e. that pre-tax profits do not increase; 3. Government expenditure affects labour productivity, 0 b′ > , and wages rise less than productivity, 1 λ < , but the increase in pre-tax profits, 0 π ′ > , is not sufficient to counteract the rise in taxation. In this case, after-tax profits decrease, 0 π ′ < .
The sign of this derivative is instead positive in one case: when 0 b′ > , 1 λ < and the increase in pre-tax profits more than compensate the rise in taxation. It follows the increase of after-tax profits, case in which after-tax profits decrease when government expenditure rises because the increase of pre-tax profits becomes again smaller than the rise in taxation.
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The equilibrium solutions for the degree of capacity utilisation, * u , and for the rate of growth,
are obtained from equations (2), (3) and (4) by taking γ as an independent variable and imposing the condition g = s.
The dynamic behaviour of the system is generated by the variation in the degree of capital utilisation in the face of a discrepancy between demand and supply, i.e. between investment and saving:
where 0 > θ is the speed at which capacity utilisation adjusts to the discrepancy between saving and investment. In what follows we assume that processes generated by the model and the occurrence of regular and irregular cycles.
The Kaleckian interpretation
In the Kaleckian interpretation the autonomous component of the investment function represents entrepreneurs' animal spirits. With α α = , the equilibrium solutions are:
There can be up to three solutions depending on the value of γ . They are indentified in Figure 1 by 
convergence towards L e makes it possible to talk of a "low growth equilibrium trap". 8 We exclude the possibility that demand exceeds the maximum level of capacity utilisation. The influence of government expenditure on the equilibrium solutions is described by the following derivatives :
For the stable equilibrium solutions L e and H e , the sign of the derivatives depends on the effect of government expenditure on after-tax profits. If 0 π ′ < the sign of the two derivatives is positive: government expenditure has an expansionary effect on capital utilisation and growth. If 0 π ′ > the opposite occurs.
As said in the previous section, 0 π ′ < when the conditions described in the following Table hold:   Table 1 Case 1 0
The expansionary influence on capital utilisation and growth occurring in these cases extends the Kaleckian "paradox of costs" to the analysis of an economy in which the government sector plays an active role (see Rowthorn, 1981 While in Figure 2 we assume that the wage-productivity elasticity is given, in Figure 3 we let λ vary to verify how different assumptions on workers' ability to appropriate changes in productivity influence the relationship between government expenditure, on the one side, and capacity utilisation and growth, on the other. An increase in λ implies a movement towards the origin of the axes and a consequent increase in the degree of capital utilisation and in the rate of growth. This too is a typical Kaleckian result: it confirms that an improvement in the wage share has a positive effect on growth. This result can be more clearly appreciated by looking at Figure 4 , which is another section of Figure 3 for a value of λ higher than that assumed in Figure 2 . Figure 4 
The Classical-Harrodian interpretation
In the Classical-Harrodian interpretation the expected rate of growth of demand is the warranted rate of growth, g s au 
There can be either one or three equilibrium solutions, denoted in Figure 5 by and to the warranted rate of growth. The other two solutions correspond to a level of capacity utilisation different from normal. 12 The number of solutions depends on the value of γ . In Figure   5 (a), the equilibrium solution e satisfies condition (10) and is globally stable. In Figure 5 are three solutions. The one corresponding to normal capacity utilisation ( e ) is unstable; the other two ( L e and H e ) are symmetrical with respect to e and are locally stable because condition (10) holds. The economy converges either to L e or H e depending on the initial value of u: if it is smaller than u , the adjustment process leads to the low equilibrium solution; otherwise, it leads to the high equilibrium solution.
Figure 5 The effects of government expenditure on the equilibrium degree of capacity utilization and rate of growth are described by the following derivatives:
They show that the influence of government intervention on the economy is more complex than in the Kaleckian interpretation. The signs of the derivatives do not depend only on the influence on after-tax profits and the equilibrium degree of capital utilisation and rate of growth may change in opposite directions.
The sign of derivative (17) 
where π η is the elasticity of the rate of growth with respect to after-tax profits and u η is the elasticity of the rate of growth with respect to the degree of capital utilisation. Condition (19) warranted rate of growth e , which is asymptotically stable. When γ overtakes P γ two new equilibrium solutions emerge owing to a pitchfork bifurcation. They correspond to L e and H e of Figure 5 (b), which are symmetrical with respect to e and locally stable, unlike e that is now unstable. The occurrence of a profit-led regime for the stable equilibrium solutions differentiates the results of the Classical-Harrodian interpretation from those of the Kaleckian interpretation.
On the contrary, for P M γ γ γ < < , the equilibrium rate of growth increases when government expenditure increases and after-tax profits decrease. Growth is thus led by the government sector, with the further support of the wage share when government expenditure affects labour productivity and wages rise at least at the same rate as productivity. The opposite trends of the rate of growth and of after-tax profits make it possible to say that in this particular case, as in the Kaleckian analysis, the "paradox of costs" holds. Yet in all other cases the increase in the size of the government sector is not beneficial to growth. The trends of the warranted and the low equilibrium solutions are similar: they both depend on the influence of government expenditure on after-tax profits. The relationship has the shape of a bell and resembles what can be found in Barro (1990) , without necessarily depending on the assumption that marginal productivity is decreasing. Growth is maximised when after-tax profits reach their The trends of the low and the warranted equilibrium solutions in Figure 6 (d) point out that there is profit-led growth. For the low equilibrium solutions we have again an "exhilarationist" regime.
Profit-led growth also holds for the high equilibrium solutions when Finally, to verify how different assumptions on workers' ability to appropriate changes in productivity influence the effects of government expenditure on capacity utilisation and growth, in Figure 7 we let the wage-productivity elasticity ( λ ) vary. Figure 7 degree of capacity utilization rate of growth
If it increases, we move towards the origin of the axis, where there are three equilibrium solutions for all values of γ and shifts from one equilibrium growth path to another, through changes in the size of the government sector, must be excluded.
To sum up, the results of the Classical-Harrodian interpretation tend to diverge from those of the Kaleckian one on account of the different role attributed to after-tax profits and to the degree of capital utilization in the investment function. The former interpretation emphasizes the role in investment decisions of the rate of profit associated with the "warranted rate of growth", whereas the latter considers the role of the rate of profit associated with a degree of capital utilization different from normal. Thus, in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the rate of capital accumulation tends to move in the contrary direction to that of the Kaleckian analysis, except in some particular cases, pointed out above, in which the degree of capital utilization can play a more prominent role than after-tax profits in affecting investment decisions.
The following Table summarises the results achieved in this Section, comparing them with those reached in the previous Section. The results also point out the existence of differences between the two interpretations as to the occurrence of structural breaks and hysteresis effects and as to the growth regimes that can emerge.
With respect to the Kaleckian one, in the Classical-Harrodian analysis there are no structural breaks and no hysteresis effects. Moreover, a profit-led regime appears in addition to those emerging in the Kaleckian analysis.
Finally, the Classical-Harrodian analysis allows the identification of a size of the government sector that maximizes the rate of growth, as occurs in Barro (1990) . This however depends on the influence of changes in government expenditure on income distribution and effective demand, which is overlooked by the literature following the lines set by Barro (1990) .
Conclusions
The analysis presented above of the effects of the different types of government expenditure on growth widens that proposed by the literature that follows the lines set by Barro (1990) . It adds the changes working through the demand side, generated by the variations in the distribution of the net income of the economy, to those working through the supply side, generated by the variations in factor productivity.
The analysis has considered a government sector with a balanced budget and an autonomous and nonlinear investment function, interpreted along a Kaleckian and a Classical-Harrodian line. It shows that for both interpretations the influence of government expenditure on the rate of growth depends on that on after-tax profits. Moreover, it points out that, due to their specification of the investment function, the two interpretations can generate different results, the most important of which are summarized below, recalling that for convenience of exposition we have defined "unproductive" the expenditure that does not affect labor productivity and "productive" the expenditure that has a positive effect on it:
• In the Kaleckian analysis, for both "productive" and "unproductive" government expenditure, the rate of growth moves in the contrary direction to after-tax profits, whereas in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the opposite tendency occurs.
• In the Kaleckian analysis the influence of "unproductive" expenditure is always beneficial to growth, whereas in the Classical-Harrodian analysis it tends to be detrimental.
• The influence of "productive" expenditure is more complex and tends to be different in the two analyses. None the less, when in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the degree of capital utilization achieves a more prominent role than after-tax profits in investment decisions, the influence of "productive" expenditure is the same as in the Kaleckian one.
• The Kaleckian analysis shows, for both kinds of expenditure, the occurrence of phemomena (structural breaks, movements away from the "low growth traps" and hysteresis effects), which do not emerge in the Classical-Harrodian one.
• Finally, when expenditure is "productive" it is possible to identify in the ClassicalHarrodian analysis a size of the government sector which maximizes the rate of growth.
This result resembles that reached by Barro (1990) , but depends on the variations in the distribution of income within the economy, rather than on the assumption that marginal productivity is decreasing. Moreover, in the Classical-Harrodian analysis the maximum rate of growth is associated with the maximum level of after-tax profits, whereas in the Kaleckian analysis when after-tax profits reach their maximum level, the rate of growth is minimized.
The different results underline the complexity of the problem considered and the importance of investigating all forces at work.
